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ABSTRACT Recent  increases  in  oil  lmports  have  spawned a variety
of  suggestlons  aimed a!  protecting  the  domestic  oil  lndustry.  If
implemented,  these  policles  including  an oil  tariff,  a  domestic
producer  subsidy,  and a  gasoline  Eax,  \dould result  in  income
transfers  involving  billions  of  dollars.  Since  they  would  have
immediate  as r,zell  as  long  tenn  inplications  which  ni.ght  differ
\,rithin  and across  policies,  we prowide  pollcy  makers lrith  a
qualitative  comparison  of  these  polices  using  a  dynarnic optinal
control  model .  Fifty  year  price  and output  paths  for  oPEc and
the  U.S.  are  simulated  assr.mint that  U.S.  producers  are
competitive  and oPEC is  a  dominant  firm,  naxirnizing  its  profits,
taking  U.S.  output  as  given.  lJe then  compare the  effects  of
these policies  on U.S.  vulnerability  and security,  macroecononic
activity,  the  federal  governnen!  budget  deficit,  and welfare
issues .Low oil  prices  in  recent  years  have benefited  consumers and  the
downstrean  refining  industry  but  have wrought  havoc  wlth  high  cost  domestic
producers  and  their  support  industries.  Falling  domestic  production  and
increasing  iuports  are  projected  to  contlnue,  causing  concern  over  dependence
on  foreign  oil  supplies  and security  issues,l  Since  these  trends  have  renewed
suggestions  to  protect  the  domestic  oil  market,  we will  corDpare sorne  of  these
suggestions  -  an oil  import  fee,  increased  gasoline  taxes,  and subsidies  to
domestic oil  and gas producers.2
Such protectionist  policies  hawe been  appealed  to  on a  number of  grounds.
Security  arguments  center  around  the  percent  of  inported  oil  and  the
macroeconomic effects  of  disrupting  these  imports.  Tariffs  and oil  product
taxes  have  federal  deficit  reductlon  appeal,  as  well,  Shifcing  the  tax  onto
foreign  oi1  suppliers  or  exercising  nonopsony power  through  taxation  has  also
1  US oil  production  (8971  thousand  b/d  in  1985 and 8115 thousand  b/d  in
1988) is  projected  to  be 7100 thousandb/d in  1993.  Crude oil  lrnports  (3201
thousand  b/d  in  1985 and  5329 thousand  b/d  in  1988)  are  projected  to  increase
xo 1545 in  1993.  Sources:  1985 -  Basic  Petroletrm Data Book. 1986 & Oll  and
cas Journal  ,  11-14-88:78.
2  For  example,  President  Bush in  his  carnpaign suggested  subsidies  to
domestic  producers.  Rosuenkowski  reconmends a  10-15  cent  per  gallon  increase
in  the  current  9 cent  excise  tax  on gasoline.  Oil  and Gas Journal  L2/L2/88:3.
AIan Greenspan  argues that  "...  a gasoline  tax  ruould do  'less  harn'  than  other
Ievies.  "  Wall  Street  Journal,  2/3/89|.2,been considered.
Broadman (1986)  argues  for  a  domestic  oil  premium.  The two  parts  of  this
premitlrn,  the  long  term  effects  of  changes  in  ixnport  demand on  the  world  price
and  the  external  costs  of  oil  supply  disruption  as  related  to  changes  in  oil
use,  are  found  to  range"from  $2.00  to  $124;00  and are  quite  sensitive  to  the
assumptions  made about  the  narkec. Broadman and Hogan (1988)  using  static
analysis  and  including  a  security  conponent  and nacroeconomic  effects  find  an
optimaL  tariff  around  $10 per  barrel.
Studies  of  rewenue consider  tax  efficlency.  Bizer  and  Stewart  (1987)
using  a  small  general  equiLibtium  open econony model  conclude  that  a  tax  on
Iabor  income dominates  both  an oil  consunption  tax  and a  tariff  in  terrns  of
the  do11ar  cost  of  additional  revenue.  The tariff  is  particularly  costly,
especially  if  the  rest  of  the  world  retaliates.  Schrnidt  and Duns  tan  (1985)
using  the  MIT-Penn-SSRC  economic nodel  find  that  a  $5.00  tariff  would  be
shifted  to  final  consumers and would  generate  higher  inflati.on  and
unemploJment  than  an  equal  rewenue  incone  tax.
Dynanlc  analysis  of  these  issues  has  included  both  analytical  work  and
s  imulations  .  Bergs  trom  (1982)  considers  the  revenue  aspects  of  an oil  tariff  by
analytically  working  out  the  static  and dynamic  optimal  oil  tariff  in  an
n-country  pure  trade  Nash equllibriun  rnodel with  toEal  oil  supplies  fixed  and
costlessly  extracted.He  concludes  that  the  optimal  tax  night  be  on the  order
of  $10.50 to  $21 per barrel.
Dynamic analysis  with  costs  in  the  model  can not  be  solved  analytically.
Thus,  Nesbitt  and Choi  (1988)  using  the  DFI Worl-d Oil  Model  dynamically
simulate  a U.S.  tariff  over  a  50 year  tlme  horizon.  In  their  model with  seven
supply  and  five  dernand  regions,  OPEC  is  divided  inco  the  core  cartel  and theconpetitive  fringe.  Oil  resources  are  a  function  of  future  additions  to
proved  reserves  and backstop  fuels  are  $60 per  barrel.  They conclude  that
OPEC  absorbs  only  a  srnall  share  of  a  $10.50  per  barrel  tariff  and find  large
losses  in  net  economic welfare.  From the  above  studies  we can  distill  a
variety  of  issues  to  consider  in  comparing  the  three  suggested  policies  -
1.  U.S.  wulnerability,  represented  by  amount of  reserves  and  ttre  share  of  oil
imports;  2.  Macroeconomic  effects,  represented  by  the  increased  price  of  oil
and any  accompanying  incorne effects;  3.  The effect  of  the  policy  on  the  U.S.
Federal  deficit;  and 4.  The amount of  tax  that  can be  shifted,  affecting
total  welfare  in  the  oil  rnarket  and the  efflciency  of  the  tax.  We can  distill
a variety  of  approaches,  as  well,  including  static  partial  equilibriurn,  static
general  equilibriurn  with  production,  static  and dynarnic general  equilibriun
pure  trade  models,  and a partial  equilibrium  dynanic  rnodel with  production.
In  choosing  from  uhese approaches,  wulnerability  issues  clearly  make
dynarnic considerations  centfal  to  the  analysis.  Pollcies  which  reduce  current
oi1  imports  and stimulate  donestic  production  will  increase  our  future
vulnerability,  if  we go  to  the  well  and  find  it  dry.  Moreower,  theory
supports  the  choice  of  dynamically  ruodellng  optimal  production  decisions  for  a
nonrenewable  natural  resource.
The effects  of  tariffs,  dornestic subsldles,  and gasoline  taxes  will
depend on the  costs  of  both  OPEC  and  domeslic  producers,  r^rhich are  rather
dissitnilar  and will  change as  reserves  are  depleted.  Howewer, the  explicit
inclusion  of  these  costs  renders  an analytical  sol-ution  unobtainable.  Thus,
we abandon the  analytical  attractiveness  of  Bergstrou  (1982)  in  favor  the  more
computationally  complex  dynamic  optinal  control  mode1.Given  the  concentration  of  reserves  in  OPEC  countriesr  and  in  the
interest  of  keeping  the  model  reproducible  and relatively  transparent,  we
focus  our  analysis  on oPEC  and U.S.  dornestic  producers.  Our  choice  of  uarket
structure  is  based on recent  work by  Griffin  (1985).4  Testing  between 4
static  econometfLc -models -that  represent  a  cartel,  competition,  target
revenues,  and property  rights,  his  results  tend  to  favor  a market  sharing
cartel  model  for  0PEC.  Testing  between a  cartel  and coxnpetitive  rnodel,  his
results  tend  to  favor  the  competitive  model  for  non-OPEG  producers.  These
assumptions  and  our  rnodel are  more forrnally  developed  below,
MODEL
In  the  model  OPEC  is  a  dominant  firm  facing  U.S.  total  dernand  for  oil
ninus  U.S.  domestic production  and non-0PEC  U.S.  imports.  Domestic producers
are  taken  to  be profit  maximizing price  takers  on the  U.S.  crude  oLl  market
while  non-OPEC  oll  suppliers  are  assumed to  supply  a  constant  amount to  the
U.S..  Both  the  U.S.  and OPEC  own oil  reserves  and maxlmize their  profits  over
a  given  time  horizon  T.  We sirnulate  the  problem  for  a base  case  as  well  as  an
oil  tariff  of  r,  a gasoline  tax  of  6,  and a subsidy  to  U.S.  producers  of  o,
assuling  no  retaliation.  The general  maximization  problem  for  the  U.S.  is  to
choose  the  production  path  of  Qu that  nnaximizes:
3  oPEc has  75t  of  global  oil  reserves  and 82t  of  noncomnunist  oil
reserves  (Oil  and Gas Journal  l2/26/88:a3)  and  is  expected  to  garner  an
increasing  share  of  the  export  market  in  the  21st  century.
4  oPEC  market  structure  and control  has  been  the  subject  of
considerable  debate.  For  sunmaries  of  the  literature  and bibliographic
references  see cately  (1984) and DahI and Ytcel  (1988).Max  rJ  LP  p6 + o  -  cu(Ru)lQu  e-"t  (1a)
0- 
-
subj ect  to  the  constraint
Ru -  -Qu  (  lb)
\,rhile  OPEC  chooses  the  production  path  for  Qo that  naxLrnLzes
3-f  te<q",eo)(1-r)  -'B6 . co(Ro)  lQo  .-."  (za)
subject  to
Ro -  -qo.  (2b)
In  the  above  expressions,  P is  the  price  of  oil,  p  is  the  percent  of  the
barrel  going  to  gasoline,  f  ls  the  inverted  denand function  for  domestic  and
OPEC  oil  by U.S.  consumers, Qo is  OpEC  productlon  gotng  to  U,S,  markets,  eu
is  U.S.  domestic production,  Ru and Ro are  reserve  levels,  and r  is  the  real
interest  rate,  Cu and Co are  average  costs  of  production,  the  functional
forms  of  which  are  deweloped  in  the  next  section,
The Hamiltoni.an for  the  U,S.  is
H :  [P -pd + o  -  cu]Qu  e-.t + po(-Qu)  (3)
The first  order  conditions  are
Ha"-  t(P-  P6 +a)  -  cule-'t  -p":o  (4)
/r"  -  -Hn  :  Cnt,Qu  e-"t  (5)
Sinilarly,  for  OPEC  we have
H:  [f(Qu,Qo)(1-r)  - F6 -  co]Qo  e-'t  + po(-eo)  (6)
Ha.:  t(fq"Qo + f)(l-r)  - B6 -Cole-!t - 1r.:0  (t)
,l.lo  :  -Hno :  CnoQo  e-"t  (8)
Ttre solution  to  the  maxinizatlon  problem  above will  need  to  satisfy  the
conscraints  (lb),  (2b)  and the  oprimaliry  condirions  (4), (5)  and (7), (8).
Since an analytical  solution  is  not  possible,  this  differential  systen  is
solved  nurnerically  using  Miele,s  (1970,  L974) highly  efficienr  ModifiedQuas  i linearlzation  Algorithn.  lale construct  perfornance  indeces  whlch  measure
the  errors  in  the  constraints  and  the  optinality  conditions  and  seek  an
iterative  solution  which  will  make  these  indeces  smaller  than  a  preselected
convergence  criterion.  Our  convergence  crltetlon  was  10-6.
The  model  inputs  are  developed  in  the  next  section  with  sirqulation
results  given  in  the  subsequent  sectLon.
MODEL  INPUTS
To develop U.S.  demand  for  domestic and OPEC  oil  we start  with  total  U.S.
demand for  oil  products:
Qt-Qu+Qo+Qn+Qp
Where Qt  -  the  total  denand for  oil  producrs  in  the  U.S..  Qu,  Qo, Qn,  and Qp
are  the  demand  for  products  satisfied  by  donestic  oil,  OPEC  oil,  non-OPEC  oi1,
and net  product  imports  respectively.  Qt  is  a constant  elasticity  function  of
dernand  price  Pd and  income Y or:s
Qt  :  e  PdPI{
To sinplify  the  analysis  and  focus  on  the  U.S.  and OPEC,  rde assume that
non-OPEC  imports  to  the  U.S.  stay  constant  at  rheir  1987 lewel  (842.785
rnillion  barrels  per  year)  over  the  simulation  period  :6
J  We chose  the  constant  elasticity  functional  form  because  it  is  by  far
the  most  popuLar  functional  form  for  econometric  estimates  of  oil  product
demand.  Good in  sample  fius  hawe been  obtained  even  over  rather  long
estimation  periods .
6  The fol-lowing  oil  exports  rneasured in  millions  of  tons  and derived
frorn median  forecasts  of  an  International  Energy l,Iorkshop poll  of  64
organizations  (See Manne and Schrattenholzer  (1989),  suggest  that  holding  non-
oPEC itnports  into  the  U.S.  constant  is  a  reasonable  upper  bound.  Imports  of
non U.S.  OECD  countries  are  expected to  continually  increase,  suggesting  they
wiII  not  be likely  to  increase  exports  to  the  U.S.  The Centrally  Planned
Economies  (CPE) may be  expected  to  increase  exports  sonelrhat  in  the  near
future,  but  in  the  longer  term  are  expected  to  absorb  rnore of  their  productionQu+Qo  + 842.785  + Qp  *  opdtf
Since  consuner  welfare  depends on the  demand for  oil  products,  we nust  first
relate  this  demand to  the  derived  demand for  domestic  and oPEC  oi1  which  is
inputted  into  our  simulation  model.  Product  inports  are  assumed to  be  the
saue percent,'C,  of  U.S.total  dernand  as in  19877  and product  denand price  Pd
ls  assruned to  be  the  same percent,  d,  of  product  supply  price,  P.  Under  these
assumptions,  U.S.  demand  for  crude oil  as a function  of  supply  price  of  oiL
(P) is:
Qu  + Qo  + 842.785: (1-d) o(dP)rY'
and price  as a function  of  U.S.  and OPEC  production  is:
P :  (L/4)lL/((L-6)a)  (Qu + qo+ 842.185)lrtq  Y-"rp
There  are  a nurnber of  estinates  of  price  and  income elasticity  for  crude
oil  and an even  larger  nurnber of  estixnate  of  elasticities  for  various
petroleum  products.  From these,  rrre  choose base  case  price  and  income
elasticities  of  -.9  and  .8,  which are nonnalized  around 1987 wariable  values
giving  an  inverted  demand function  of:8
themselves.  The non-0PEC developing  countries,  although  net  exporters  now,
are  expected  to  be  net  Lmporters  by  2000.  Thus,  OPEC  is  the  only  area  of  the
world  expected  to  have  any  significant  irrcfease  in  export  capacity.
Net OiI  Exporrs  1985  1990  2000  20L0
cPE  94  LL5.45  97  90.5
Non-US  OECD  -577.5  -640  -635  -659
oPEC  699  8s8.4  1165  "90
Other Mkt.  1  2L.5  -41.8  -26
7  Product  inports  are  needed to  balance  denands in  warious  product
markets  and we assume this  need for  balauce  will  contlnue.  Current  trends
suggest  thac  expectations  of  large  OPEC  product  imports  will  not  naterialize
as  these  products  have  tended  to  find  other  uarkets,
I  For  surveys  of  these elasticities  see Bohi  (1"9S1),  Bohl  and
Zinmerman (f984),  and Dahl  (1985).  Many of  the  derived  estinates  for  producu
price  elastlcity  are betlreen -.3  and -1.5,  while  rnany  of  those  for  income
elasticity  are  between .6  and 1.4.  We  have experimented with  priceP -  135.83 (Qu  + Qo  + 842.785)-r.ry.es
Moving  on  to  the  supply  side  of  the  market,  we start  with  OPEC  and U.S.
estimated  proved  reserves  as  given  in  Table  1.  Slnce  thls  ls  clearly  a  lower
bound on  total  reserves  available  over  the  simulation  Deriod  and  slnce  OPEC
reserves  have  recenlly  been estinated  to  be  50 to  90 percent  rnore than  current
lewels,  we increase  them 50*  for  our  base  case  simulations.  production  costs
were  available  for  one year  for  Aramco for  Saudl  Arabia.  They were  derived
for  the  U.S.  by  distributing  toEal  production  costs  over  oil  and gas by  energy
content.  Costs  for  the  other  OPEC  menbers were  exLrapolated  fron  U.S.  and
Saudi  numbers based  on production  per  well,  all  given  in  Table  l.  These
production  costs  \^'ere used  to  dewelop  the  following  cost  function  for  OPEC:
Co  -  20.043 -  .00002  Ro
Ttre slope  of  this  function  was deriwed  from  a  regression  of  the  above
costs  on reserves  and  the  intercept  was arrived  at  by  normalizing  around  the
average  of  the  above OPEC  production  cosLs  and  total  OpEC  reserves.  The U.S.
cost  function,  deweloped as in  pindyck  (1978),  is:
Cu:K/Ru:L3772L.s/Rw
With  K chosen by  nornalizing  around  the  production  costs  and reserves  given  in
Table  1.  Last,  we assume  income g,rows  at  2.5*  per  year  and the  real  interest
rate  is  5t. s
elasticities  ranging  frorn  -.7  to  -L.1.  The  1987 values  are  norrnalized  around
1987 product  demand minus  nec  product  inports  of  5.624  billion  barrels,  GDp of
$4.461  trillion,  and an oil  supply  price  of  916.35.
I  We have  chosen  the  same discount  rate  for  OpEC and  the  U.S.  since
there  is  conflicting  evidence  in  the  literature  whether  OpEC rnight  have  a
higher  or  lower  rate  of  discount  than  the  U.S.  Earlier  work  using  propercy
rights  arguments  such  as  Mead  (1979)  and  Johany  (1980)  suggest  that  their
discount  rate  should  be  lower  than  those  for  oil  cornpanies.  More  recent  \^rork
by  Adelrnan  (1986)  suggests  rhar  OPEC,s discount  rate  should  be  higher.RESULTS
We begin  by  presenting  and brlefly  dlscussing  sinulated  optinal  tine
paths  for  U.S.  production,  OPEC  production,  and oil  prlces  for  a base case
with  no  tariff  or  subsidy,  and  the  current  gasoline  tax  of  9  cents  per  gallon
(r,  o,  and.  6 :  0).  These paths  are  the  bases  for  tbe  policy
evaluations.  (These base  case  paths  are  given  in  Figure  1.  End point  walues
for  all  prices  and outputs  are  glven  in  Table  2.)
Policies  are  then  irnplenented  one at  a  time  and new price  and  output
paths  are  computed,  I,Ie present  and discuss  complete  slnulation  results  for
each of  our  representative  policies:  r  *25*,  a -  $5 per  barrel,  6:  $.25 per
gallon.  These policies  are  roughly  cornparable  since  the  25*  import  fee
corresponds to  an iniuial  tariff  of  $5.00,  while  the  gasoline  tax  can be
translated  into  a  tax  on oil  at  roughly  $5.00  per  barrel.  Although  numerous
cases  were  done for  each policy,  in  the  interest  of  clarity  and brevity,  we
only  discuss  interesting  implications  from  this  sensitivity  analysis  conducted
across  various  rates  and parameters.r0  (Tirue paths  for  these  representative
policies  are  given  in  Figures  2-4.  For  improwed resolution,  they  are
expressed as ratios  to  the  base case).
For  the  base case,  simulated  U.S.  production  is  lower  than  actual  1987
production,  OPEC  production  ls  higher,  oil  prices  lightly  higher,  and lotal
U.S.  denand lower.  (See Table  2.)  U.S sirnulated productl.on begins  at  359 but
fal1s  to  only  7*  of  OPEC  produclion  over  the  sinulation  period.  It  declines
fairLy  steeply  during  the  50 year  time  horizon  to  around  19t  of  lts  initial
10  Coroplete results  of  all  slrnulations  are  avallable  upon  request  from
the  authors.leveL,  whereas  OPEC  production  is  more slable  with  a very  flat  conwex shape.rr
Final  OPEC  production  is  928 of  its  initial  level  resulting  from OPEC's  very
high  level  of  reserves  eoupled  with  relatively  low  and stable  production
sosts.  Initial  sirnulated price  is  $20.18 tising  an average of  2.12 per  year
ros80.86.
The tariff  increases  U.S.  consumer prices  and decreases  OPEC  output
throughout  the  simulation  period.  As  can be  seen  in  Figure  1,  the  increase  in
prices  in  the  final  years  are  greater  than  those  in  the  early  years.  Thls
prlce  path,  which  leads  to  higher  U.S  producrion  in  rhe  early  years  and  lower
production  in  later  years,  results  in  an earller  depletlon  of  the  resource  and
subsequently  higher  production  costs.  These effects  are  more pronounced,  the
higher  the  tariff.  The tariff  has the  highest  price  path  of  aII  the  policies.
The U.S.  producer  subsidy  increases  initial  production, lowers  lnitial
prices,  and  raises  final  prices.  The higher  the  subsldy,  the  lorrer  the
initial  price  and  the  higher  the  inirial  production.  Therefore,  wlth  a
subsldy  both  producers  and consuners  are  better  off  in  the  early  years.
Interestingly  enough,  OPEC  production  is  also  increased  with  uhe subsidy  in
the  early  years.  Increased  relatlve  U.S.  producLion  !n  the  early  years
reduces  OPEC's narket  share,  increases  their  demand elasticity  and,  hence,
results  in  increased  production.  As  can be  seen  fron  Figure  2,  the  subsidy
has the  highest  U.S.production  of  a1l  policies  in  the  early  years,  however the
reverse  is  true  in  the  future.
The gasoline  tax  increases  consumer prices  more than  it  decreases
producer  prices  and causes  the  least  price  variation  ftorn  the  base  case  among
the  three  policies.  The tax  effects  on  the  two production  profiles  are
rr  The convex  shape results  from  the  growth  in  denand.
10somewhat different,  as  can be  seen  in  Figures  2 and  3.  OPEC  productlon,  which
is  lower  over  the  whole  period,  fal1s  reLatlwely  more in  the  earlier  part  of
the  period  conwerging  towards  the  base  case  in  the  later  part.  Thus,  as  the
tax  becoues  a  snaller  percent  of  supply  price  and  its  discounted  value  is
less,  OPEC'akers  its  production  proflle  1ess.  The U.S.  pattern  is  rather
nore  interesting.  Statlc  analysis  would  suggest  that  U.S.  production  should
fall  as  well.  In  a  dynanic  setting,  lhe  tax  causes  U.S.  production  to  be
postponed  into  the  future,  and  thus,  U.S.  production  on1-y falls  in  the  early
period.
These protectionist  policies  have long  term  implications  on U.S.
wulnerability  and  security,  macroeconomic activity,  the  federal  Bovernment
budget  deficit,  and welfare  issues.  I.Ie  proceed  by  briefly  touching  on  these
effects  across  policies.  (Simulated  numerical  walues  are  glven  !n  Table  3  for
comparison  purposes  and  to  provide  information  on orders  of  nagnitude.  )
Vulnerability  and security  are  rneasured by  reserves  left  in  the  ground  at
Che end of  50 years  and  the  share  of  inported  oil.  Relatiwe  to  the  base  ease,
the  tariff  leaves  8.13  less,  the  subsidy  7.7t  less,  and the  gasoline  tax  over
0.1*  more reserves  after  50 years.  The increase  in  the  anount  of  reserves
left  in  the  ground  nith  the  gasoline  tax  is  srnall  because  the  tax  shifts
production  fron  the  present  to  the  future.
A1I  policles  lower  the  inltial  share of  irnports  from the  base case.The
uariff  and  gasoline  tax  lower  shares  over  the  whole  period  with  the  gasoline
tax  having  a  sone\,/hat larger  effect  in  the  early  period  but  converging  to  that
for  the  tariff  as  OPEC's share  continues  to  increase,  The subsidy  is  the  only
policy  that  raises  future  vulnerabllity  by  lncreasing  the  inport  share  after
2002.  Hovtever,  one can  see from  Table  3  that  by  the  end of  the  sirnulation
L1period  the  differences  are  rather  modest.
In  terms  of  overall  long  term  security,  it  would  seen  that  the  gasoline
tax  would  be  best.  It  leaves  nore  reserves  in  the  ground  and has  the  lor,rest
share  for  OPEC  in  all  years.  The subsidy,  although  enhancing  security  early
on,  would  be  costly  later.  It  would  leave  only  slightly  more reserves  in  the
ground  than  the  tariff,  whlch  lowered  import  shares  over  the  entire  period.
These policies  also  hawe important  irnplications  on producer  Trelfare,
calculated  as  changes  in  profits,  and on consumer welfare,  calculated  as
cttanges in  consumer surplus  using  Hausnan's  (1981)  measure of  compensated
varialion.  Discounted present  walues of  these neasures,  all  given  !n  Table  3,
determine  deadweight  losses  or  gains  in  total  welfare  in  the  oil  market  for
each policy.  To be able  to  compare  che different  policies,  we express  the
losses  or  gains  in  lrelfare  as  a  percentage  of  total  revenues  from  the  tariff
or  the  tax.  For  the  subsidy,  the  welfare  gains  are  calculated  by  adding  the
gains  in  producer  and consumer surplus  minus  the  subsldy  pald  by  the
goverrunent.  Thls  net  gain  (or  loss)  is  then  expressed  as  a percentage  of  the
total  subs  ldy.
In  terms  of  total  welfare,  the  tariff  is  best.  Since  OpEC  absorbs  a
large  share of  the  rariff  (OPEC  profits  fall  29.2*),the  rariff  turns  our  ro  be
\,relfare enhancing for  the  U.S..  The welfare  gains  are  21,2  cents  per  dollar
of  revenue generated.  The increase  in  U.S.  profits  (1f.St)  plus  the  tariff
revenues  outlreigh  the  losses  in  consumer surplus.  These gains  in  welfare
diminish  as  we approach  uhe welfare  neutral  rate  which  is  between  50 and 55*.
The subsidy  turns  out  to  be welfare  enhancing  as weII.  U.S.  consumers
are better  off  due co the  decrease in  prices  and U.S.  profits  increase  by
22.4*.  The welfare  galn  (the  increases  !n  constrmer and producer  surpJ-us minusthe  lotal  subsidy)  i.s  23.6  cents  per  dollar  of  subsidy.  These gains  however,
are  similar  to  those  of  the  tariff's  and diurinish  as we approach  the  welfate
neutral  rate  of  around  $11 per  barrel.  This  would  be  OPEC's preferred  pollcy
as well,  as profits  fall  by  only  0.5$.
The gasoline  tax  scores  the  lowest  in  terms  of  welfare.  The welfare  loss
is  $1.26 per  dollar  of  revenue generated.  U.S.  producer  profits  fall  by  2.5*.
Although  foteign  suppliers  of  oil  bear  some of  the  burden  of  the  tax,  (OPEC
profits  fall  by  f5.3*),  the  increase  in  the  gasoline  tax  is  stlll  costly  for
cne u.5.
CONCLUSIONS
Feelings  of  lnsecurity  engendered by  rising  oil  illlPorts  have  increased
U.S.  protectionist  sentiments  towards the  domestic oil  industry.  Since  there
are  long  term  lnplications  of  these  policies,  we compare the  effects  of  an  oil
tariff,  a subsidy  to  U.S.  oil  producers,  and an increase  in  the  gasoline  tax
using  an  optiml  control  frarnework.  U.S.  producers  are  modeled  as  competltive
while  OPEC  ls  considered  a  dominant  firrn,  maxirnlzlng  lts  profits  taking  U.S.
output  as  given.  The simulations  suggest  the  highest  U.S.  producer  prices  for
a  tariff,  while  consumer prices  tend  to  be highest  over  rnuch of  the  period  for
the  gasoline  tax.  U.S.  production  is  highest  ln  the  early  years  with  the
subsldy  and highest  in  the  later  years  with  the  gasoline  tax,  OPEC's
production  path  is  highest  with  rhe  subsidy.
These sinulated  prices  and output  paths  have  long  term  policy
implications  relating  to  U.S.  vulnerability  and security,  and welfare  issues.
They  show that  there  is  a  tradeoff  between  the  issues  of  wulnerability  and
security,  and welfare.  The gasoline  tax  whlch  erdrances security  and lessens
U.S.  wulnerability  to  future  oil  disruptions  is  also  the  most welfare  cosuly
13Policy.  The subsidy,  the  preferred  policy  of  OPEC, is  welfare  enhancing  bur
clearly  makes us  more dependent  on  foreign  o11  ln  Che future,  From a welfare
point  of  view,  the  tariff  is  besr.  Ir  ls  also  the  policy  which  raises  the
most  rewenues  for  the  government,  Surprisingly,  the  slrnulations  suggest  that
based  on  the -crlteria  included  in  our  analysis,  the  ad valoren  tariff  assuring
no  retaliatlon  rnlght  be  the  best  choice  over  the  sixouLati-on period.  Although
it  causes higher  depletion,  ir  did  not  lower  the  U.S.,s  share  in  the  market
over  the  slmulation  period.
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l6Table  l:  Variables  representing  OPEC's production  capacity,
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COUNTRY Reserves
Production  Production































'1020.0 t543.L2  4.37
1351.0 200r.47  4.04
648.O  771.43  4.91
157.0  t70.28  5.34
284.0  1632.t8  4.30
2342.0 6487.53  0.87
4054.0  6894.56  0.58
399  .2  813  .03  4  .  88
1186.0  205.40  5.31
1096.0 3019.28  3  .32
12  39  .0  988.83  4.16
2096.0 3408.13  3  .05
1592.0  162.50  5  .34
15s.8  528.L4  5.09
8275.1  13.00  5.45
Sources:
Units:
OiI  and Gas Journal ,  LZ/28/87:.35-37.
OPEC  Annual  Statistical  Bulletin,
Cost  -  Authors  conputations,  Basic  Petroleun
DataBook, Oll  and Gas Journal  5/LL/87:7O
0i1  reserves  are measured in  rnillions  of  barrels,
production  costs  ln  dollars  per  barrel,  production
is  in  100 of  barrels  per  day,  while  production  per  well
measured in  barrels  .















































of  barrels  per  year.
Units:  Prices  in  1987
Quantities  are
U.  S. dollars  per
all  in  nillions
18Table  3: Effects  of  a  25t  oil  Tarlff,  a 95.00 per
a $.25 per  Gallon  Gasoline  Tax,
Barrel,  and
Base
Effect  on:  Case
U.  S. Reserves 2037  L1O3
OPEC's  Share in  1987  73.72
OPEC's  Share in  2037  93.0*
A US Profits
A OPEC  Profits
A  Consurner  Surplus
Deadweight  Losses  (-  -  gain)






-  73.  98






















Units:  Values  are  for  the  whole  period  unless  othemise  noted.
Reserves  are  xneasured in  nillions  of  barfels.
A US Profits,  A Consuner Surplus,  Deadweight  losses  and
A OPEC  profits  are  expressed  as  a percentage  of  the
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Figure  2.  Prices  (expressed  as  a  ratio  to  the  base  case).
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Figure  3.  U.S.  Production  (expressed as a ratio to  the  base case).L2
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l'igure  4,  OPEC  Production  (expressed as a ratio  to  the  base case).
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